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Many of the present day major cities have their territory partitioned into administrative subdivisions for a wide 
range of local governance purposes. Partisan local elections are held for electing the politicians into public 
administration offices of the subdivisions, which may lead to the creation of local partisan conflicts within 
each unit. In this paper, I analyze the influence of this local political context on the electoral behaviors formed 
at the national legislative elections to see if the local political context in the subdivisions determines a lack of 
democratic representation by rendering the socio-spatial conflicts of the city irrelevant. I explore this on 
Bucharest, a large city of nearly two million, at the national legislative elections between 2000-2016. The 
methodology is drawn from the subfield of electoral geography, as I spatial analyze the geographic clustering 
of electoral behaviors in the six subdivisions of Bucharest. The results in Bucharest show the capacity of the 
subdivisions to influence voting decisions through the local political context when certain conditions are met.  
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In the context of an increasingly complex urban life, many of the present day major cities are partitioned 
into administrative subdivisions for a wide range of local governance purposes, like taxation, sanitary 
services, transportation, education, sewage or water facilities. Administrative partitioning is present both 
within cities, but also at the upper scale of metropolitan areas. In this paper, I am interested in the 
subdivisions within cities, since this administrative fragmentation received much less attention in recent 
decades than that of metropolitan areas. Regularly, the degree of administrative fragmentation goes along 
with the size of the cities. Larger cities are more fragmented. However, there are significant differences 
worldwide. In the United States, it is quite common for small cities to have several administrative 
subdivisions. In the Global South, or in Central and Eastern Europe, generally, the major cities or capitals 
are partitioned. In Western Europe, fragmentation is quite common for medium-sized cities as well. In this 
paper, I am interested in the political fragmentation generated by this administrative partitioning. For this, I 
explore the influence political fragmentation arised from administrative partitioning has on the electoral 
behaviors within large cities. I research this topic through a case study of the legislative national elections in 
Bucharest, Romania’s capital, between 2000-2016. While today's urban spaces undergo increasingly 
dynamic and rapid socio-cultural micro-transformations, this field of political and administrative 
fragmentation in cities remains very poorly explored.  
Previous studies have shown that there is an influence of local political context on the electoral 
behaviors formed in that place (Johnston and Pattie, 2006). However, studies in this area have been 
particularly concerned with elections in localities or constituencies, while the urban level has not yet been 
fully investigated. One way in which the local political context influences electoral behavior is through the 
existence of a partisan majority or a strong local political leader. In an older study of the US cities it was 
observed that there is no precise and clear influence the administrative fragmentation of cities has on 
political participation (Lowery and Lyons, 1989). In this regard, I will operationalize the local political context 
in subdivisions by identifying the partisan affiliation of mayors in local institutions. For this matter, I set the 
field of research to cities fragmented into subdivisions where partisan elections are held for local public 
offices. The present case study has a decisive exploratory nature. There is, however, a precise objective to 
the study, namely that of understanding the influence of the local political context from subdivisions on the 
electoral behaviors in the general national elections. 
In the realm of political decision making process, questions of urban governing and institutional 
hierarchies are currently dominated by the theme of large metropolitan areas because, in the current stage 
of globalization, the success of urban spaces is decisively determined by their performance in an ultra-
competitive economic space, henceforth policy relevant actors seek to create these grand regions of 
clustered and integrated urban spaces (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Frisken and Norris, 2001). Also, 
academics concerned with democracy and urban governance were mostly focused on the new institutions 
created at the metropolitan level (Kubler, 2012; Buser, 2013; Zimmermann, 2014). Little attention is given 
to the political consequences generated from the administrative fragmentation of today's increasingly 
diverse social and cultural cities. Through the present paper I propose a contribution on this topic. I shall 
analyze the influence of the political life in the sub-divisions on the electoral behaviors at the national 
legislative elections in Bucharest between 2000-2016. For this, I employ spatial econometrics to quantify 
the clustering of electoral performances in the geographical space of Bucharest’s subdivisions. I discuss 
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highlight and explain the empirical patterns. Through the approach and topic, this paper also contributes to 
the growing literature on Romanian urban electoral geographies (Guțoiu, 2018, 2019). 
The following section presents a framework for understanding electoral behaviors in their 
geographic context. Afterwards, the focus is shifted to the case study. Firstly, I discuss the Romanian 
electoral politics and the ways in which local mayors tend to influence local electoral behaviors. Secondly, I 
present the administrative partitioning of Bucharest into its six subdivisions and describe their socio-
spatialities. Next, I discuss the local political context, referring to the distribution of mayors and their 
partisan affiliation, in the subdivisions of Bucharest at the local elections from 2000-2016. After, I describe 
the statistical tools used for electoral spatial data analysis. Following these, I explore the clustering of 
electoral performances in Bucharest at the level of subdivisions and discuss the geographic structuring in 
relation to the local political context and socio-spatiality. The final conclusions close the paper. 
 
2.Understanding electoral behaviors in their geographic context 
The approach used in this paper is underpinned by theorizations and empirical advances from the 
subdiscipline of electoral geography, in which the research of voting spatiality is the central topic (Leib and 
Quinton, 2011). In electoral geography there are two main approaches to the spatiality of voting. One deals 
with the simple description of the spatial distribution of voting. Another area, which also fundaments the 
approach in this paper, is concerned with the relation between the voting decision and its geographical 
context. In the last decades, within the subfield of electoral geography a robust volume of works has been 
generated to help explain the mechanisms of this influence. In the following paragraphs I focus my attention 
on these developments. 
In this approach, the geographical context is not only an empty space where the electoral behavior 
is formed independently, but it's intrinsically linked to the construction of the voting decision (Agnew 1990). 
However, scholars of electoral geography do not agree on the precise set of mechanisms by which the 
geographical context counts for the electoral behaviors (Van der Wusten and Mamadouh, 2014). One 
approach in electoral geography explains the contextual influence through microsociologies, where the 
voting decision is influenced by the social networks that constitute the geographical context (Pattie and 
Johnston, 2000). Another approach, developed within American electoral geography, adds to this 
microsociological explanation also a geographic perspective (Agnew 1987 and 1996). These two 
approaches are complementary (Johnston and Pattie, 2006). 
John Agnew (1987 and 1996) developed theoretical arguments for understanding the relationship 
between voting and its geographical context. Agnew argues that the voting decision is formed within a 
context where microsociologies and structures of everyday life meet with social, political, economic and 
cultural multiscalar processes. A major role is played here by political parties. Electoral behaviors are 
directly linked to the political agenda set by parties. The society and the state vary geographically, also the 
political parties acting as mediators between the two develop by influencing and being influenced by space. 
The geographic context matters for voter. In the geographic space voters meet the parties. Also, the 
political parties are not merely electoral vehicles, but instead they channel expectations from voters, and 
are therefore evaluated according to their potential to distribute resources, so finally the electoral 
geography becomes mostly the spatialization of who get’s what? (Shin and Agnew, 2008: p. 52). Because, 
today, in post-industrial democracies, the old partisan attachments based on social classes vanished, and 
the political competition has become multidimensional and value-based (Evans, 2017), the analysis of 
electoral behavior can be significantly improved through a contextual perspective that captures the dynamic 
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The influence of political life from an administrative subdivision on electoral behaviors in that 
subdivision I conceptualize it as a contextual influence of the geographic context on the voting decision. 
Here, political parties play a primary role. Studies of electoral geography based on a social construction of 
the space described the relationship between electoral mobilization and political parties as one mediated 
and influenced by the geographical context. For this reason, before the spatial analysis of voting, I discuss 
the operationalization of geographical context, by referring to the political and socio-spatial processes 




3.Mayors and local electoral politics in Romania 
Understanding the influence that a political context has on electoral behaviors within a space starts with the 
description of the actual political context. For our case study on Bucharest, the political context of interest is 
located within the six subdivisions, where elections are held every four years for the subdivision’s mayoral 
and local legislative seats. In this section I present the mechanisms through which Romanian mayors 
influence voting decisions at national elections. In this regard, I describe the literature on electoral 
mobilization generated by local Romanian politicians and mayors. 
This influence is determined by the nature of Romanian democracy, marked by low ideological 
institutionalization of party system (Gherghina and Jiglau, 2011), the high level of fluidity of the party 
system (Soare et al., 2013), the weak partisan identification (Gherghina, 2015) and a strong personalized 
competition (Gheorghiță, 2014). In Romania, mayors are elected by popular vote. Mayors are the executive 
authority, while a local council elected through proportional representation is the legislative body. Usually, 
Romanian citizens have more trust in the mayor than in the MPs (Tufiș, 2008), and thus are more likely to 
be influenced by their actions for mobilization. Ties with local politicians are stronger, as the MPs are 
perceived rather more corrupt, distant and distrustful. Local electoral campaigns are carried out with the 
high involvement of mayors, who are usually also the leaders of local party branches. These local influential 
politicians are rewarded with important revenues for their major contribution to their parties electoral 
success (Roper, 2006; Gherghina and Chiru, 2013). Such revenues can become a factor in building local 
loyalties. Private contributions are another important part of electoral mobilization resources (Gherghina 
and Volintiru, 2017). Also, Romanian politicians who are serving as mayors, use the office to increase their 
political capital to facilitate the reelection (Chiru and Gherghina, 2012). In Romania, the number of 
reelections for a mayor are unlimited. In a country with weak democratic institutions and doctrinary 
competition, such as Romania, poorer voters benevolently keep corrupt politicians in power because of the 
perception that they can derive material benefits from corrupt leaders exploiting private or public resources 
(Manzetti and Wilson, 2007). In addition, corruption also exists as vote buying (Gherghina, 2013). 
 
 
4.Administrative subdivisions and socio-spatialities in Bucharest 
Bucharest’s subdivisions are named sectors (sectoare) and are officially named with numbers ranging from 
1 to 6 and resemble the geometric shape of a circular sector (see Figure 1). The six sectors are pretty 
much similar in their extent and shape. In fact, the sectors are also similar in terms of socio-spatiality. In 
Table 1 we see that the surface and total number of inhabitants vary little between the six sectors. With the 
exception of sector 1, Bucharest is divided into subdivisions of almost equal sizes. Sector 1 has a larger 
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due to the circular sector shape of the subdivisions and the radial-concentric historical and geographic 






Bucharest’s subdivisions and types of housings 
 
 
Table 1. Population and area for Bucharest’s sectors. 
Sector Inhabitants Area (sq. km) Density 
(inhab. per sq. 
km) 
Share from total 
inhab. in the city 
Share from total 
area of the city 
1 225453 68 3315 12% 29% 
2 345370 32 10793 18% 13% 
3 385439 34 11336 20% 14% 
4 287828 34 8466 15% 14% 
5 271575 30 9053 14% 13% 
6 367760 38 9678 20% 16% 
Total 1883425 238 7914 
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Inside them, each sector has strong differences. The sectors were created in 1979 under the direct 
autocratic leadership of Nicolae Ceaușescu, with the purpose of remodelling Bucharest through 
uniformizing its socio-spatial by administrative fragmentation. During the totalitarian regime, Bucharest was 
reshaped by the political and economic exploitation of the state (Cavalcanti 1997). All urban transformation 
was part of state policy to standardize the urban and social space (Zarecor, 2018). The socio-spatiality of 
post-1989 Bucharest is mostly the consequence of state socialism transformations. About 80% of the 
houses in Bucharest are socialist era apartments. Through the ubiquity of its durable physical concrete 
constructions, the socialist city preserved its urban legacy. However, the socialist cities were not some 
monoliths of concrete blocks of flats. Despite the regime's official intentions to achieve uniformization, 
socialist cities were displaying solid patterns of socio-spatial segregation (Marcińczak et al., 2014). These 
patterns were either inherited from the bourgeois era, or they were the result of preferential housing 
allocation during socialism. Also, the quality of socialist housing and access to public services were not 
equally spatially distributed. After 1990, Bucharest develops under the neoliberal project of urban 
development, so that the socio-spatial differences inherited from the state socialism era are strengthened. 
The large socialist housing estates are located mainly outside the central historical city, consisting 
of pre-WW II single-family dwellings, villas, and small blocks (Figure 1). High-quality socialist blocks are 
also clustered in central city on main boulevards and in central-southern area transformed by Ceausescu. 
The central city has also small pockets of spatial violence between the wealthy and the vulnerable groups 
(Armaș and Gavriș, 2016), however, as a general feature, the historical city concentrates the high-value 
land (Rufat and Suditu, 2008). As each sector comprises a segment of the historical central city, the 
situation creates strong socio-spatial contrasts within the subdivisions. 
The largest areas of socialist collective housings are located in sectors 3,4 and 6. Smaller socialist 
housings are located in sectors 1, 2 and 5. Within all six subdivisions, these socialist developments oppose 
to the older pre-WW II city. However, the socialist city is not monolithic. Significant spatial differences exists 
in terms of quality and equity of access to public services. Social filtering based on housing prices 
developed in the present neoliberal era also as a result of these conditions. The poorest and least desired 
areas on the housing market in Bucharest are the self-built neighborhoods and the low quality socialist 
blocks. High quality blocks are those in central area, while medium quality blocks are clustered on main 
roads or within the microrayons from sectors 3 and 6 (Maxim, 2018). 
Alongside the socialist era fabric, within the area outside the historical space there are also former 
neighborhoods of pre-WWII villas, located mainly in the sector 1 which is wealthier and with a higher share 
of low-density houses and green spaces than other subdivisions. Vulnerable populations are predominantly 
found at the spatial peripheries of the city (excepting sector 1). The largest area comprising poorer groups 
is located in sector 5, in the Rahova and Ferentari neighborhoods, dominated by low quality socialist era 
blocks or self-built homes. In sector 5, a strong contrast exists between the poorer areas and the pre-WW II 
villas of Cotroceni (the most expensive neighborhood). The vast majority of those near to the median 
income are located in the large socialist estates of sectors 3, 4 and 6. On the outer ring, on small pockets, 
former semi-urban and quasi-rural peripheries during socialist era are now transformed into low-density 
neighborhoods for the suburbanites. 
Socio-spatial contrasts are present both within and between the sectors. Within sectors, the 
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socialist, and neoliberal urban transformations and the socio-spatial contrasts created from these 
developments all lack political representation at the level of Bucharest’s subdivisions.  
 
 
 5.Local political contexts in Bucharest’s subdivisions 
In this section, I describe the political context of Bucharest’s subdivisions through a longitudinal perspective 
during the years 2000-2016. The purpose is to understand the political contexts and conditions developed 
within subdivisions that may influence electoral behaviors in national legislative elections. The local political 
contexts are those created following the local elections, which are held during the first half of the year, a 
few months before the legislative elections. In this regard, I use for analysis the results at the elections for 
mayoral seat. Also, supplementary, I discuss the distribution of seats in the subdivisions local council. 
Since the Romanian legislation does not limit the number of terms a mayor can have, politicians can build 
and consolidate strong loyalties as mayors throughout many years. At the 1996 and 2000 elections no 
mayor was reelected. This prevented the appearance of local loyalties within Bucharest’s subdivisions. The 
mayors that won in 1996 and 2000 were even from other parties than their predecessors. Only starting with 
the elections of 2000, a political capital is beginning to form at the top of the administrations in subdivisions. 
We can see this phenomenon in Table 2 which shows the partisan affiliation of politicians who have won 
mayor or local councilor seats at the local elections in Bucharest between 2000-2016. Annex 1 comprises 
the name of parties and alliances in Romanian and English, since for text flow reasons in the body of the 
paper I use only the parties and alliances acronyms. Also, in this paper, I make no reference to the names 
of the local mayors as I believe this is not relevant to the arguments made in this paper as the constant 
name references would only hinder the text flow. 
At the 2000 elections, the mayoral seats and pluralities in all seven councils (Bucharest and its 
subdivisions) were won by the PDSR. The landslide victory was achieved by the PDSR because of its 
position as party in opposition which gained much support as a consequence of the protest vote against the 
CDR, the incumbent alliance during 1996-2000 and the main actor in Bucharest’s local politics during the 
90s. The PDSR won proportional shares of seats in all subdivisions. As there were no solid political 
loyalties within sectors, the parties’ performances didn’t vary much between sectors. The mayoral elections 
for Bucharest were won by the charismatic Traian Băsescu (PD). 
In 2004, the PNL-PD Alliance led by Băsescu, who is reelected as city’s mayor, won most of the 
mayoral mandates and pluralities in local councils within subdivisions. The alliance consisted of two 
partners. The PNL won mayoral seats in sector 1, 4 and 6, and the PD in sector 3. In sectors 2 and 5, 
loyalties were formed, as the PSD (PDSR) mayors were reelected. 
At the 2008 elections, five mayors of sectors were reelected. In sector 3, the PDL won the mayoral 
seat and a large majority in the local council. In sector 6, the PDL candidate was reelected as mayor, 
having won in 2004 as PNL’s candidate. In sectors 2 and 5, mayors from the PSD were again reelected, 
while the party won plurality of seats in the local council. In sector 1, the mayor from the PNL was 
reelected, while the PDL won plurality in council. In sector 4, a candidate from the PC (a small party linked 
to the PSD) is elected from the first time. At the city level, the PDL won a plurality in the council, while the 
mayoral seat was won by Sorin Oprescu, an independent candidate close to the PSD. At the 2008 
elections, with the exception of sector 4, in each subdivision there were solid loyalties towards one 
politician or political party. 
The main feature of the 2012 elections was the massive protest vote against the PDL, the 
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scored a landslide victory in Bucharest, winning five mayor seats and majorities in every council. Excepting 
the candidates from the PDL, all other mayors were reelected. 
In 2016, the PSD in alliance with a small party (the UNPR) achieves a landslide victory, winning all 
seven mayoral seats and pluralities in all councils. However, it is worth mentioning that five of the elected 
mayors won their first term. Together with the local sympathies towards their politicians, a major part of the 
PSD’s success in 2016 was caused by the lack of any solid opposition from the other parties. The main 
opposition towards the PSD in Bucharest was the USB, a newly established urban regional party in 
Bucharest. 
In this section my intention was to describe from a longitudinal perspective the local political 
contexts in Bucharest’s subdivisions such that the local political loyalties and sympathies towards 
politicians or parties could be better understood. There appears to be significant patterns of temporal 
evolution. Support towards local politicians or parties grow up to the 2008 local elections when they are the 
strongest, as five mayors from three different parties won the reelection. Each sector had a dominant 
political sympathy. Starting with the 2012 elections, the degree of reelection gradually decreases. Because 
the local political capital diminishes and some strongholds disappear, at the elections of 2012 and 2016, 
the city is dominated by actors that extended their power relatively proportionally throughout the 
subdivisions. 
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6.Description of data and statistical tools 
The empirical part of the paper implies the spatial analysis of electoral data in order to identify geographic 
clusters of support. In this section, I discuss the methodology used for spatial analysis. The electoral data 
consists of votes (percentages) scored at the legislative elections between 2000-2016 by the political 
parties of interest. Also, the selection of these parties I describe further in the current section. 
Clusterization of values for a variable within geographic space is commonly known as spatial 
autocorrelation or spatial dependence (O’Sullivan and Unwin, 2003) and is measured through spatial 
econometrics, which acknowledges and integrates within calculations the correlation between observations 
determined by their proximity within space. In recent decades, spatial econometrics tools have gained 
recognition as necessary methods for understanding political behaviors within their geographic context 
(O’Loughlin, Flint and Anselin, 1994; Shin and Agnew, 2011). In spatial econometrics, the data are 
analyzed by reference to their geographic position. The electoral data I employ are georeferenced through 
the geographic coordinates of polling locations.  
One classic instrument for measuring clustering in geographical space is Moran's I (Getis, 2010), 
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where: w is an unit in a row-standardized spatial weights matrix (W) that encapsulates the spatial proximity 
between observations (i.e. 1=connection; 0=disconnection) and x is the vote share for party of interest.  
The matrix I employ for this study summarizes three connections for each observation, as a result 
of distance-based definition of the three most proximate neighbors. Actually, Moran’s I is an index that 
measures the relations between observations in space and their spatially lagged correspondence, which is 
the weighted average of values from surrounding observations. Values of I range from -1 (dispersion) to 1 
(clusterization). To calculate the statistical significance, a z-score can be computed by producing randomly 
distributed samples (Anselin, 1988). To calculate Moran’s I and z-score I employ the free software package 
GeoDa, vers. 1.14.0. The index’s value expresses the degree of global spatial autocorrelation of values 
within the geographic space of interest. For this paper, the value of Moran’s I expresses the spatial 
autocorrelation for voting share (percentages) of political parties at the level of Bucharest.  
In order to identify local clusterization I use Local Moran’s I statistic, proposed by Luc Anselin 
(1995) as a Local Indicator of Spatial Association.  







                                                             (2) 
 
where: z is measured through standard deviations from the average, and the inference is computed 
through a similar randomization method as for Global Moran’s I, except now it is computed in turn for each 
observation. Local Moran’s I is a statistic computed for each observation and measures the degree of 
clusterization surrounding that observation.  
In GeoDa, for each observation, a Local Moran's I is calculated, its statistical significance is verified 
and one of the following four types of spatial association is identified:  
1) clusters of high values surrounded by high values,  
2) clusters of low values surrounded by low values,  
3) outliers of low values surrounded by high values, and  
4) outliers of high values surrounded by low values.  
For the analysis in this paper, I employ cluster maps computed in GeoDa, with statistical significant spatial 
association regimes identified at a level of p=0.05. After describing the statistical tools used in exploring the 




7.Exploring electoral behaviors in Bucharest’s subdivisions at the legislative elections during 2000-
2016 
I have argued in the previous sections how the administrative fragmentation of Bucharest enables the 
developing of certain local political contexts that can influence behaviors at other national general elections. 
As the city becomes increasingly divided from partisan politics formed within its administrative subdivisions, 
the political representation at legislative elections will become less focused on socio-spatial conflicts and 
more on partisan conflicts that transpose conflicts between political or administrative elites as well as 
loyalties towards these elites. In this section, I move further to the analysis of relationship between local 
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shall measure the degree of geographical clustering of electoral behaviors in Bucharest and its 
subdivisions. This clustering is further discussed in relation with the local political context and the socio-
spatial contrasts. 
Table 3 gives descriptive statistics for parties and alliances of interest. The results are aggregated 
at the level of subdivisions, Bucharest and the national. The table depicts actors with at least 10% of votes 
in Bucharest at the legislative elections. As an exception, the PNL (9% in 2000) is also placed here 
because of its importance in national and local politics. In the present section I shall spatially analyse the 
electoral results for these actors. Because the legislative elections are held a few months after the local 
elections, most of the actors in Table 3 are under the same name in Table 2.  
However, the reader is encouraged to use also the Annex 1 to better understand the actors in the 
context of these high fluidity Romanian politics. 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the national legislative elections in Bucharest and the national level. 





Sectors Bucharest National 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
2000  PNL 9% 9% 9% 8% 7% 9% 9% 7% 0.81 
PD 11% 11% 11% 12% 9% 11% 11% 7% 0.98 
CDR 17% 15% 12% 10% 8% 11% 12% 5% 3.14 
PRM 15% 17% 19% 21% 23% 19% 19% 19% 2.91 
PDSR-PUR-
PSDR 
34% 34% 35% 35% 36% 35% 34% 37% 0.96 
2004 PSD+PUR 30% 30% 30% 31% 33% 29% 30% 37% 1.23 
PNL-PD 49% 48% 48% 46% 42% 50% 47% 31% 3.00 
2008  PNL 24% 15% 13% 14% 13% 18% 16% 19% 4.35 
PSD+PC 29% 32% 29% 40% 44% 30% 33% 33% 6.23 
PDL 36% 36% 48% 35% 25% 41% 38% 32% 7.60 
2012 ARD 22% 23% 19% 17% 16% 21% 20% 17% 2.77 
USL 64% 63% 67% 68% 66% 64% 65% 59% 1.76 
2016  PNL 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 20% 0.31 
USR 29% 25% 26% 24% 20% 26% 25% 9% 3.09 
PSD 32% 37% 38% 40% 45% 38% 38% 45% 4.43 
 
 
Results in Table 3 are provided mainly as points of reference and a starting point for the following 
spatial analysis. In this regard, the standard deviation values do provide an image on the variation of 
performances between subdivisions and it features a clear longitudinal pattern. At the 2000 elections, the 
standard deviations were low for the PDSR-PUR-PSDR (alliance formed from the dominant PDSR party 
and other small two parties), the PD and the PNL, and at an average value for the PRM and the CDR. The 
PDSR who won the elections with a consistent margin had a largely proportional performance between 
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Romanian politics, who participated again in alliance with the small party of the PUR, the standard 
deviation increases to 1.23. The value is much higher for the other main actor, the Alliance of the PNL and 
the PD, namely 3. The PSD+PUR won the elections at the national level, however, in Bucharest, the PNL-
PD won by a large margin of 17%. In 2008, all the three actors, the PSD+PC, the PDL and the PNL have 
electoral geographies with major variations between sectors. Values are at an all-time high for the period of 
interest for each of the three actors: the PSD+PC 6.23, the PDL 7.60 and the PNL 4.35. The standard 
deviations decrease in 2012, when the USL alliance achieved a landslide victory throughout the entire city. 
Its scores were proportionally distributed between subdivisions. Although the 2016 standard deviations are 
higher than in 2012 they do not reach the 2008 level. The analysis of standard deviations and aggregate 
scores shows a measure of variation between sectors, however it does not help us identify the geographic 
clustering. For this reason, the paper continues with the spatial analysis of electoral data. 
I begin the spatial analysis with the Moran’s I, which gives a global measurement for geographic 
clusterization of electoral scores at the level of the entire city. Moran’s I and z-scores for candidates of 
interest are displayed in Table 4.  
Note that a Moran’s I value of 1.0 indicates perfect positive spatial autocorrelation, meaning that 
each observation can effectively be predicted by the average of nearby observation. For the positive spatial 




             Table 4. Global Moran’s I and z-score in Bucharest. 
Year Actor Moran's I z-score 
2000 PNL 0.53 12.05 
PD 0.46 10.41 
CDR 0.72 16.21 
PRM 0.72 16.89 
PDSR-PUR-PSDR 0.37 7.67 
2004 PSD+PUR 0.41 9.01 
PNL-PD 0.61 13.65 
2008 PNL 0.74 16.39 
PSD 0.75 16.59 
PDL 0.73 16.88 
2012 ARD 0.72 15.53 
USL 0.46 9.99 
2016 PNL 0.23 5.18 
USR 0.6 13.21 
PSD 0.7 15.38 
 
The degree of global spatial autocorrelation varies between candidates. The highest degree of 
geographic clusterization we find at the elections of 2008. The value of Moran’s I signals a high degree of 
clusterization for each candidate, the PSD+PC, the PDL and the PNL, respectively. The 2008 legislative 
elections displayed, at both national and local level, a competition that was close to the center and had 
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smallest turnout (39%) in all legislative elections held after 1990. If the electoral mobilization is generated 
mainly by the national level political agenda, an electoral campaign that does not polarize the public space 
and does not stresses subjects of social conflicts should create a weak clustered electoral geography. 
However, the 2008 electoral geographies in Bucharest were heavily clustered. The hypothesis of the paper 
suggests that this clusterization may be the result of local political contexts in Bucharest’s sectors, as the 
city’s subdivisions at that time had mayors from three different parties and most of the subdivisions were 
strongholds for politicians and parties at the top level of local public administration. 
At the 2000 elections, high degree of clusterization is present only at the CDR and the PRM. Their 
electoral support came from well-defined social groups. The CDR, was an alliance formed around its main 
element, the PNTCD which was at the time the main party in the governing coalition. The alliance was 
struck by a strong protest voting and relied only on its electoral core, namely those relatively high educated 
or wealthy. The PRM was a populist party that relied on protest votes mostly from those vulnerable. The 
PDSR-PUR-PSDR, an alliance with its main element, the dominant PDSR, won the 2000 elections by 
relying on protest votes and a centered stance. In Bucharest, where the alliance also won with a large 
margin, did it with no significant loyalties throughout the subdivisions. This may explain the low-to-moderate 
degree of global clusterization of the PDSR-PUR-PSDR electoral geography in Bucharest. At the 2004 
elections, values of Moran’s I indicated that there is an average degree of clustering, as the competition 
was polarized between the PSD+PUR and the PNL-PD. The first was stronger in the rural areas and the 
poor urban spaces and relied more on those disadvantaged. The latter relied on those generally more 
educated and younger. At that time, unlike in 2000, there were also some loyalties formed towards local 
politicians in the subdivisions, as the mayors in sector 2 and 5 were reelected earlier that year. Also, the 
city was divided between these two alliances, since the PNL-PD also won some mayoral seats in the local 
election. As the loyalties towards local politicians and parties gradually increased between 2000-2008 so 
did the degree of clusterization. 
After 2008, the degree of clusterization decreases, but remains rather at medium level. In 2012, 
both the local and legislative elections were won by the USL. Its success was due to the economic vote 
against the PDL (ARD) which implemented many austerity policies during its incumbency between 2009-
2012 and was left in Bucharest only with its hardcore electorate consisting of relatively educated, wealthy 
and young, but with very little potential to mobilize with the help of local politicians. As a result of these 
clearly-defined patterns of support, the ARD’s electoral geography was strongly clusterized. In comparison, 
the USL’s electoral geography was rather moderated clusterized. At the local elections, the USL achieved a 
landslide victory across the subdivisions. Its rhetoric attracted diverse social segments, as the alliance was 
formed by two parties with different electoral bases, the PSD targeting the poorer and the PNL those more 
educated. At the 2016 legislative elections, high clusterization is found at the two main parties in Bucharest, 
PSD (I=0.7) and USR (0.6), while the third ranked party, the PNL, had a low-level clusterization (0.23). As 
the recent previous elections, the 2016 competition attracted again little interest from the voters (39% 
turnout). However, the presence of the USR, a new party targeting the higher educated and younger strata, 
slightly radicalized the scene. In 2016, the PSD won all seven mayoral seats and pluralities in all councils. 
Yet, as we seen from the descriptive statistics, both the scores of the PSD and the USR had major 
variations between subdivisions. This was a departure from the 2000 and 2012 victories of the PSD, when 
its scores were relatively proportionally distributed. 
Moran's I analysis showed that high spatial autocorrelations exist at the 2008 elections. Medium-to-
high levels are present in 2012 and 2016. The 2000 elections marked the lowest spatial autocorrelation. 
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first (and second) reelection. However, the Global Moran does not show the local patterns of support, 
hence a final conclusion on the spatial autocorrelation and the local political context should be stated after 
the local analysis, which follows next. 
For text flow reasons, LISA maps are displayed in Annex 2. The maps show clusters that are 
significant at 0.05 level and can be used as benchmark for comparison. In the following analysis, I shall 
quantify only the clusters of high-high values or low-low values which have all of its four observations in the 
same sector. This option better isolates the spatial contours of local political contexts and behaviors 
subdivisions. The number of groups with central location and neighbors in same sectors are listed in Table 




Table 5. Overall distribution of groups of polling locations and neighboring polling locations within the same sector 







Share (%) of 
groups within 
same sector 
from all pollings 
in Bucharest 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Bucharest 
2000 40 50 36 37 27 36 226 284 80 
2004 42 48 38 38 28 34 228 284 80 
2008 42 48 37 38 27 33 225 281 80 
2012 42 47 36 37 25 32 219 278 79 
2016 43 48 29 37 25 33 215 278 77 
 
 
The quantified clusters of interest are shown in Table 6. Within each subdivision and for every 
candidate the share of clusters (high-high or low-low) is computed from the total groups of central locations 
and their neighbors located in the same sector. The table shows a degree of local spatial autocorrelation for 
each party or alliance in relation to the geographic space existing in the respective sector and helps to 
identify the geographic clustering of performances in Bucharest’s administrative subdivisions. As a rule of 
thumb, I consider weights of 50% or more to be eloquent for revealing an important concentration. 
 
 
Table 6. Share of clusters comprised of central location and neighboring location located within the same sector computed from 
the total number of potential clusters within the respective sector 
Year Actor Share of clusters (%) 
High-high Low-low 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2000 PNL 13 10 11 0 0 22 8 6 8 8 33 0 
PD 5 0 8 38 0 0 3 0 8 0 48 0 
CDR 48 34 3 0 0 0 0 8 11 30 78 8 
PRM 0 6 3 30 85 8 48 16 8 0 0 3 
PDSR 3 0 8 0 7 3 5 34 0 0 0 0 
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PNL-PD 24 10 3 0 0 15 2 4 8 0 43 0 
2008 PNL 83 0 0 3 0 3 0 8 32 32 48 0 
PSD 0 6 0 47 67 0 17 25 14 0 0 6 
PDL 0 0 81 0 0 6 5 4 0 8 85 0 
2012 ARD 17 43 0 0 0 0 0 2 11 35 44 0 
USL 7 0 14 32 12 0 2 26 0 0 4 22 
2016 PNL 5 17 0 0 8 0 2 2 3 5 16 9 
USR 30 4 3 0 0 0 0 8 10 16 60 0 
PSD 0 10 10 16 60 0 58 15 0 0 0 0 
 
At the legislative elections of 2000 and 2004, there was no major clusterization that can be 
explained as the result of a local political context. Extended spaces of clusters in 2000, namely those high-
high for the CDR in sector 1 and for the PRM in sector 5, those low-low for the CDR in sector 5, low-low for 
the PRM in sector 1 and in 2004 those low-low for the PNL-PD in sector 5, are best explained by the 
distribution socio-spatial in these subdivisions and the clearly-defined rhetoric of the political actors. In 
2004, the PSD+PC was the only actor with reelected mayors, in sector 2 and 5. However, the alliance does 
not have major clusterization located in these two subdivisions. The local and legislative elections 2004 
were won in Bucharest with a large margin by the PNL-PD alliance. The competition in Bucharest was 
polarized by the national political arena. The presidential elections of 2004 were held simultaneously with 
the legislative ones, and the mayor of Bucharest, Traian Băsescu, the candidate from the PNL-PD side, 
wins the run-off. His candidacy acted as a strong bandwagon effect for its alliance. This was the context in 
which the influence of the PSD mayors reelected in 2004 was substantially reduced. This may also explain 
why the sympathy for PNL-PD was distributed relatively proportionally between sectors, although the 
alliance had won four mayoral seats earlier that year. Unlike 2000 and 2004, the influence of the 
subdivisions on the electoral behaviors in Bucharest was substantially inforced at the next legislative 
elections. 
As shown in Table 6, electoral support at the 2008 legislative elections was highly clustered within 
Bucharest’s subdivisions. Each of the three actors of interest scored much better performances in the 
sectors where they had mayors. For the PSD there are 67% clusters of high-high values in sector 5 where 
the local mayor was reelected for its third term, and 47% in sector 4 where the mayor was elected as a 
candidate of the small party PC. The PNL achieved its best performances in sector 1 (83% high-high 
clusters). The PDL concentrated its best scores in sector 3 (67% high-high clusters). Clusters of high 
support are missing in sector 2 and sector 6. For the PSD+PC the best scores are clustered in sector 4 and 
sector 5. It is here that on a wide geographical area both the local political context and the socio-spatial is 
favourable to the alliance. For this reason, the PSD+PC does not concentrate its high performances in 
sector 2, although the local mayor was constantly reelected. In sector 6 there was no geographic clustering. 
The PDL scored in this subdivision performances above its average, yet they were far from those recorded 
in sector 3. In sector 6, the mayor only recently switched sides to the PDL, so the local electoral base of its 
new party was not so strong as in sector 3. The strong geographical clustering of electoral behaviors within 
Bucharest subdivisions at the 2008 elections can be attributed to the local political contexts within the 
administrative divisions of the city. At that time, the city was partitioned by partisan arrangements within 
sectors, as almost each sector had strong loyalties towards one politician or political party. Also, each of 
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context was also enhanced by some features of the political competition. The 2008 elections were not 
polarized at the national level, they lacked ideological battles and generated the lowest turnout in all post-
1990 legislative elections. 
At the following elections of 2012 and 2016, the clustering within subdivisions is reduced to lower 
levels. Some clusters of high support are present in sector 2 for the ARD alliance (43%) which included 
also the UNPR, the small party of the local mayor, and in sector 5 in the USR’s electoral geography (60%). 
However, the general clustering within the sectors is reduced, in comparison with previous elections. Now, 
the electoral scores are rather dispersed throughout the city. The factors I used to explain the clustering at 
the 2008 elections disappeared or were much weaker at these elections. The same parties and alliances 
that won with a landslide victory the local elections were also the victors with large margins in almost all 
subdivisions. In 2012 and 2016, Bucharest was not divided into strongholds of different parties as it was in 
2008. Moreover, the loyalties created in previous electoral cycles disappeared after 2008. For example, in 
sector 3, the legacy of the PDL’s 2008 major success does not count almost at all for the ARD in 2012 or 
the PNL in 2016 (the two parties merged in 2014). In 2016, the clusters are generated by the socio-spatial 
of the city and the national rhetoric of parties, since the USR mobilizes much stronger in the richer, 
educated and younger areas, whilst the PSD builds an electoral geography with hotspots of support in the 
poorer areas. Also, the 2012 and 2016 elections were more polarized at the national level and had stronger 




In this article I have studied the influence administrative fragmentation of a big city has on the electoral 
behaviors in that city during national legislative elections. The influence of administrative fragmentation I 
operationalized it through the local political context generated at the level of city’s subdivisions following 
local elections results. In this regard I used as case study the electoral behaviors in the six subdivisions of 
Bucharest, the capital of Romania, at the national legislative elections from 2000-2016.   
For the data analysis I employed methodology and statistical tools drawn from the subdiscipline of 
the electoral geography in order to capture and understand the spatialization of the vote and the 
concentration of the electoral behaviors in the subdivisions of Bucharest. The aim of the empirical analysis 
was to see if the local political context in subdivisions develops into an electoral competition that mobilizes 
and realigns the electorate by disregarding socio-spatial conflicts. Bucharest is divided into six subdivisions 
(named with numbers from 1 to 6) which have the shape of a circular sector and display mostly similar 
socio-spatial structures: a central gentrified and richer area and outside of it a large area of socialist 
collective housing estates. The sectors display similarities because their boundaries were draw during the 
totalitarian socialist era as an arbitrary mean to achieve socio-spatial standardization within the city. An 
exception is made here by sector 1 which has large clusters of rich and low-density area and sector 5 
which has a larger area of poor and vulnerable groups. The results of the study showed the capacity of 
Bucharest’s subdivisions to influence electoral behaviors in national legislative elections. However, the 
results need to be discussed within the framework of the Romanian political system, because the influence 
is mediated by several variables that determine the relationship between local political context and electoral 
behaviors. On these matters I develop the remaining paragraphs of the conclusions. 
The analysis made on the electoral behaviors in Bucharest at the legislative elections from 2000-
2016 revealed that there were elections in which the local political context in sectors matters and the 
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behaviors do not cluster significantly in subdivisions. The strongest clusterization was at the 2008 elections, 
when the Bucharest subdivisions acted as strongholds for politicians and parties that dominated local 
politics. At that time most of mayors in subdivisions were serving their second or third consecutive term and 
consolidated over time their relationship with the local electorate. This clusterization was present at all three 
actors at the 2008 elections, namely the PDL, the PNL and the PSD + PC alliance, as each dominated the 
local political contexts and concentrated their best scores in at least one sector. At this election, the 
influence was also enhanced by the low degree of polarization and ideological substance at the national 
scale of politics and the extremely low turnout. 
In the other elections, the local political contexts had mainly a weak or insignificant influence on the 
electoral behaviors in subdivisions because the vast majority of mayors were at that time serving for their 
first term, thus without the time needed to develop strong local loyalties. However, there are also mayors 
that won a second term, yet without generating a clusterization of electoral sympathies in their subdivisions. 
I suggested in the analysis that the weak or lack of clusterization at other elections, in this case 2000, 2012 
and 2016, may have been also determined by the landslide victory scored by alliances or parties at the 
local elections. These results created different political contexts at the level of Bucharest in comparison with 
the 2008 electoral year, when there was no dominant actor and the city was also highly fragmentated from 
political partisanships. The administrative fragmentation of Bucharest influenced the local electoral 
behaviors in the city when there was also a political fragmentation of the city. 
The analysis of the case study on the electoral behaviors in the six administrative subdivisions of 
Bucharest revealed a scenario where the socio-spatial conflicts can lose political representation in an 
administrative and political partitioned large city. This line of research should also be studied in other urban 
contexts in Europe or on other continents. With this contribution, I hope more attention will be engaged in 
the study of the relationship between the administrative subdivisions, the electoral behaviors and the socio-
spatiality of cities. Many of the major contemporary cities still maintain decades-old administrative partitions 
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Annex 1. Acronyms and names for parties and alliances mentioned in the paper 
Acronym Romanian English 
CDR Convenția Democrată Română Romanian Democratic Convention 
PC Partidul Conservator Conservative Party 
PD Partidul Democrat Democratic Party 
PDL Partidul Democrat Liberal Democratic Liberal Party 
PDSR Partidul Democrației Sociale din România Party of Social Democracy in Romania 
PNL Partidul Național Liberal National Liberal Party 
PNTCD Partidul Național Țărănesc Creștin Democrat Christian Democratic National Peasants' 
Party 
PRM Partidul România Mare Greater Romania Party 
PSD Partidul Social Democrat Social Democratic Party 
PSDR Partidul Social Democrat Român Romanian Social Democratic Party 
PUR Partidul Umanist Român Humanist Romanian Party 
UNPR Uniunea Națională pentru Progresul României National Union for the Progress of Romania 
USB Uniunea Salvați Bucureștiul Save Bucharest Union 
USL Uniunea Social-Liberală Social Liberal Union 
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